Operation Northwoods, or Northwoods, was a series of false-flag operation proposals that emerged within the government of the United States in 1962. Commit to the proposals for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other officials called terrorist attacks in U.S. cities and elsewhere. These terrorist acts were to be blamed on Cuba, to win public support for a war against the nation that had recently under Fidel Castro Communist created. Part of the Operation Northwoods was to “develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.”
Operation Northwoods proposals hijackings and bombings by the introduction of forged evidence to imply that the Cuban government would be followed. It states:
“The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would put the United States justified in the apparent position of suffering symptoms of a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.”
Several other proposals were included in Operation Northwoods, including real or simulated actions against various U.S. military and civilian targets. The plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer signed and developed to the Secretary of Defense. Although part of the U.S. government anti-communist Cuban Project initiative Operation Northwoods was never officially recognized, and the proposals in the plan was never executed.
James Bamford holds North Woods as follows:
Operation Northwoods, which called the written consent of the Chairman and every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for innocent people to had shot on American streets, to be sunk boat with refugees in Cuba on the high seas, in a wave of violent terrorism Washington, DC, Miami and elsewhere started. People would be for bomb attacks have not committed; planes would be hijacked. With false evidence, everything would be blamed on Castro, thus giving Lemnitzer and his cronies the excuse, and public and international support, they had to start their war.
Development and publication
The main proposal was in a document entitled “Justification for U.S. military intervention in Cuba (TS), a top-secret collection of draft memoranda from the Department of Defense (DoD) written and presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The document was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 13th March presented as a preliminary submission for planning. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that both the overt and covert aspects of such an operation will be assigned to them.
The previously secret document was originally published on 18 November 1997 by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board, a federal agency monitors the release of official documents that you are to John F. Kennedy assassination. A total of 1521 pages of once-secret military records from 1962 to 1964 were released simultaneously by the review board said.
“Annex to Appendix A” and “Annex to Appendix to Appendix A” of the Northwoods document were first published online on 6 November 1998 by the National Security Archive in a joint venture with CNN as part of CNN’s 1998 Cold War television documentary series – especially as a complement to the documentary “Episode 10: Cuba, on 29 aired November 1998. “Annex to Appendix to Appendix A” is the section of the document containing the proposals of terrorist attacks level.
The Northwoods document was published online on 30 April 2001 in a more complete form (ie, including cover memoranda) by the National Security Archive.
What they did
In response to a request for pretexts for military intervention by the Chief of Operations of the Cuba Project, Brig General Edward Lansdale, the document listed methods and outlined plans that the authors believed the public and international support for U.S. military intervention in Cuba Garner . These were supposed to be staged attacks of Cuban origin.
Since it seems desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for U.S. military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to have been necessary preparatory measures, such as has developed in response to Task 33 c, could be used as a first attempt to provoke run are Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture during the execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
A series of well-coordinated incidents will be planned to take in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance, done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. incidents on a credible attack (not in chronological order):
Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
Land friendly Cubans in uniform “over-the-fence” to stage attack on base.
Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).
Blow up ammunition to the base; fires.
Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
Lob mortar shells from outside the base in the base. Some damage to installations.
Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
Capture militia storms the base.
Sabotage ship in harbor, large fire-naphthalene.
Basin near port entrance ship. Code of Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may instead of (10) be).
b. United States would be protected by executing offensive operations to water and energy supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the foundation to respond.
c. Begin large-scale U.S. military operations.
A “Remember the Maine” incident could be arranged in various forms:
a. We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We arrange such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result cause of the Cuban attack from the air or at sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships only to study the intention of the ship was pretty convincing evidence that the ship was attacked be removed. The proximity to Havana or Santiago would be credibility, especially those people that the explosion may have seen or heard to pour fire. The U.S. could follow-up covered with an air / sea rescue operation by U.S. fighters ‘evacuate’ remaining members of the crew on the non-existent. Casualty in U.S. newspapers would be a helpful wave of national indignation.
We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
The terror campaign could be refugees seek refuge in the United States should be drawn. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban are refugees in the United States even to the extent of the injury in the cases made it widely known. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, substantiating the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of the documents prepared Cuban involvement, also in the planning of the idea of an irresponsible government would be helpful.
A “Cuban-based, Castro-supported” filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of June 14 invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is on subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua and in the present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones for the artificial exposure. For example, the advantages of sensitivity can be taken of the Dominican air force attacks in their national airspace. “Cuba” could be B-26 or C-46 aircraft of the type to make cane burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be “Cuban” messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and “Cuban” shipments of arms, would be found or caught, be coupled to the beach.
Use of MIG type aircraft by U.S. pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on ships and the destruction of the U.S. military drone of MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 would paint passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the traffic, this fact was known to convince. The main disadvantage of this proposal seems to be the security risk associated with obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, appropriate copies of the MIG of U.S. resources in about three months to be produced.
to appear Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. At the same time real deserter from the Cuban civilian and military air and surface temperature should crafts are encouraged.
It is possible for an event to demonstrate the convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot at creating a chartered civil airliner en route from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The goal would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers were off a group of college students on a holiday or to support any grouping of persons with a common interest in chartering a non-scheduled flight.
a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for civilian aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in Miami. At one time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would use the selected passengers, all under carefully prepared aliases loaded aboard. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take time the drones and the actual aircraft is expected to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the meeting point of the passenger aircraft will increase to minimum altitude and directly into an auxiliary field Eglin AFB where arrangements are made to evacuate the passengers and the aircraft back to its original state. The drones will now continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will start the transfer on the international distress frequency “MAY” message he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transfer is the destruction of the aircraft, which is triggered by radio interrupted. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the western hemisphere, say the U.S., what happened to the aircraft instead of the U.S. is trying to “sell” the incident.
It is possible for an event to bring the would appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will track from Homestead AFB, Florida, sent to the vicinity of Cuba. Your task will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights on a regular basis. Crews would be briefed at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast will remain, but they would have live ammunition in the event that hostile actions of the Cuban MIGs have been worn.
b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban island this pilot would broadcast that he was jumped by MIGs and went under. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be the right people, quickly stored and reached a new tail number. The pilot, the mission would have carried out under a pseudonym would be back its own identity and has returned to his normal seat. The pilot and aircraft would then be gone.
c. In exactly the same time that the aircraft was probably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would pay F-101 parts, parachute, ride, etc., at about 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast. The pilots returning to Homestead would be a true story, if they did have. Search ships and aircraft could be shipped and displayed in parts of the aircraft.
Related Operation Mongoose proposals
In addition to Operation Northwoods, under the Operation Mongoose program of the U.S. Department of Defense held a number of similar proposals to be taken against the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro.
Twelve of these proposals by a second February 1962 memorandum entitled “Possible Actions to provoke, harass or Disrupt Cuba,” are written by Brig. submitted to General William H. Craig, and to Brig. General Edward Lansdale, the commander of Operation Mongoose project.
The memorandum describes Operation Bingo, a plan to “create an incident that has an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba and thus to overthrow an apology for the use of U.S. military might over the current Government of Cuba. ”
It also includes operation dirty trick to blame a piece of land when Castro 1962 Mercury crashed manned space flight carrying John Glenn, said: “The goal is the irrevocable proof that, should the MERCURY orbit have not occupied, the fault lies with the Communists .. et al Cuba [sic] “It continues:” This production by the various clues which would prove electronic interference on the part of Cubans to be achieved “.
Even after Lemnitzer lost his job as General Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, false-flag pretext for planned operations, at least in 1963. Another U.S. Department of Defense policy paper prepared in 1963 discussed a plan to give the impression that Cuba was a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), so that the United States could retaliatory attack. The U.S. Department of Defense document says one of the scenarios, “a fictional” Cuban “attack on a member of the OAS could be established, and the attacked state could be asked to take measures of self-defense and the assistance of the United States and OAS.”
The plan was confident that by this action, “the U.S. could almost certainly get the necessary two-thirds support among OAS members for collective action against Cuba.”
Included in the nations of the Joint Chiefs suggested as targets for covert attacks were Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. Since both were members of the British Commonwealth, the Joint Chiefs hoped that attack by capturing and then falsely blaming Cuba, the USA, people in Switzerland could be in support of a war against Castro foment. As the U.S. Department of Defense report noted:
Each of the situations described above are designed by nature extremely risky in our democratic system to maintain the security, may be after the fact, with very great difficulty. If the decision was the establishment of a contrived situation it is one that should be limited to participation by U.S. personnel only to the most trusted covert personnel. This indicates the inability to use the military units for each aspect of the constructed situation. ”
The U.S. Department beat of Defense report even secretly attacking payment of a person in the Castro government in the United States: “The only area remaining would be to test it to one of the subordinates to bribe Castro, an attack on [the U.S. Navy initiate base] Guantanamo. ”
The continued pressure against the Cuban government by internal elements of the U.S. military and intelligence community (the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Project, etc.) have already called on President John F. Kennedy to try to burgeoning reins hardline anti-communist feeling that intent was in a proactive, aggressive action against communist movements around the globe. After the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had fired CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director Charles P. Cabell, and Deputy Director Richard Bissell, and turned his attention towards Vietnam. Kennedy had also robbed the CIA responsibility for paramilitary operations such as the Bay of Pigs and turned it to the U.S. Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, as Commander in Chief, Kennedy was able to control more directly. Kennedy personally expressed outrage many of his employees about growing influence of the CIA on the civilian population and government in America, and his attempt to curtail the CIA’s extensive Cold War, and paramilitary operations was a direct expression of that concern.
Kennedy rejected the Northwoods proposal personally, and it is now the Joint Chiefs’ turn to make his displeasure. A JCS / Pentagon document (Ed Lansdale Memo) of 16 March 1962 as meeting with the President, March 16, 1962 reads: “General Lemnitzer commented that the military contingency plans for U.S. intervention, he had also had plans to use to create plausible pretexts. Force, with the pretext of attacks on U.S. aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America, for we could fight back. The president said bluntly that we do not discuss the use of military force that General Lemnitzer the United States could thus be found in Berlin or elsewhere engaged, he could not with the planned four divisions in Cuba. “The proposal was to authorize the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, but was not implemented.
After presenting the Northwoods plan from Kennedy Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although he was Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in January 1963. American armed forces leaders began to realize how soft Kennedy los Cuba, and the president is increasingly unpopular with the military, a gap that came to a head during Kennedy’s disagreement with the service chiefs on the Cuban missile crisis.
On 3 August 2001 adopted the National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba (the main legislative organ of the Republic of Cuba) a statement relating to Operation Northwoods and Operation Mongoose which it condemned as the U.S. government plans.